1667 BEFORE THE BOARD OF INTEREST ARBITRATION In the Matter of: UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE : : Volume 8 and : (Pgs. 1667 to 1790) POSTAL POLICE OFFICERS : ASSOCIATION Washington, D.C. Friday, February 7, 2014 The following pages constitute the proceedings

held in the above-captioned matter at the
United States Postal Service, 475 L'Enfant Plaza,
Southwest, Washington, D.C. before Erick M.
Thacker, RPR, of Capital Reporting Company, a
Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia,
commencing at 9:31 a.m., when were present on
behalf of the respective parties:

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1668
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                  APPEARANCES
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   Before Arbitrators:
          James C. Oldham, Impartial Chair
          Robert A. Dufek, USPS Member
          James Bjork, PPOA Member
   On behalf of the PPOA:
 6
          ARLUS J. STEPHENS, ESQUIRE
          DONNA MCKINNON, ESQUIRE
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10
   On behalf of the U.S. Postal Service:
11
          TERESA A. GONSALVES, ESQUIRE
          JULIENNE BRAMESCO, ESQUIRE
12
          United States Postal Service
          475 L'Enfant Plaza, Southwest
          Washington, D.C. 20260
13
          (202) 268-6704
14
   ALSO PRESENT:
15
          Chris Vitolo, PPOA
16
          Eric Freeman, PPOA
          Joshua Pierce, PPOA
17
          Mike Plaugher, PPOA
          Joe Alexandrovich, USPS
18
          Sonya J. Penn, USPS
          Katherine P. Sullivan, USPS
19
          Janet Peterson, USPS
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21
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1669
1
                   C O N T E N T S
  WITNESS: DIRECT CROSS REDIRECT RECROSS
2
3 JOE ALEXANDROVICH -- 1670
4 MICHAEL BILLINGSLEY 1775 1776
5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
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16
    (Exhibit books were tendered to the arbitrator.)
17
18
19
20
21
22
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		1670
1	PROCEEDINGS	
2	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Folks, are we all	
3	here ready to go?	
4	MR. STEPHENS: Yes.	
5	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Joe, consider	
6	yourself still sworn.	
7	THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.	
8	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: All right. We're	
9	having cross-examination this morning, I believe.	
10	Arlus, whenever you're ready.	
11	WHEREUPON,	
12	JOE ALEXANDROVICH	
13	was called for continued examination, and having	
14	been previously duly sworn was examined and	
15	testified further as follows:	
16	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE	
17	UNION	
18	BY MR. STEPHENS	
19	Q Okay. Good morning, Joe.	
20	A Good morning, Arlus.	
21	Q So I'm going to ask you some questions	
22	today, and I think I'm just going to largely	

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1671
    largely do it based off of the -- off of the
 1
    PowerPoint for a point of reference. So I guess
    the -- the first slide I'd like to ask you about
    would be Slide No. 4.
              ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Just a second,
    Arlus.
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Yeah, I've just got
 8
    to get --
 9
              MR. STEPHENS: I'm sorry. This is --
10
              ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Volume 2 --
11
              MS. GONSALVES: Tab I.
12
              MR. STEPHENS: Volume 2, Tab I.
13
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Okay. Thanks.
14
    BY MR. STEPHENS
15
              First, just a couple questions about
    the limitations of the -- of the OES data.
16
    first of all, I guess -- well, I'll get there in
17
18
    a second.
19
               The -- the estimates are obviously not
20
    100 percent of American workers. It's based on
21
    a -- it's a big sample, but it's not 100 percent?
         A A very large sample, yes.
22
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		1672
1	Q Right. And we're dealing with in	
2	terms of the Union's claim that we're police	
3	officers, we're dealing with an even smaller	
4	sample size; is that correct?	
5	A The sample size is 1.2 million	
6	establishments.	
7	Q Correct. But the number of police	
8	officers is far smaller than that, correct?	
9	A There there are about 700,000 police	
10	officers nationwide.	
11	Q Okay. Well, we'll get there. The	
12	question is the private sector area I'll	
13	just get there in a second.	
14	On the third bullet point, it's correct	
15	that you can find the OES data not just by sector	
16	and industry, but also by locality; is that	
17	correct?	
18	A Yes, you can. It has some very	
19	detailed locality data.	
20	Q Okay. Let's go on to Slide No. 7. The	
21	data we have here is national data. It's not	
22	broken out by locality; is that correct?	
İ		

		1672
1	A That's national data, correct.	1673
2	Q So the locality data the locality	
3	data for the metropolitan areas in which the	
4	Postal Police work would all be are all going	
5	to be individually probably higher than what	
6	the mean that's been chosen here; is that right?	
7	A Well, I I don't know. I mean, you	
8	say probably. I don't know without looking at	
9	it.	
10	Q Okay. But the only data that's been	
11	given here is mean national data?	
12	A Mean national data, correct.	
13	Q Okay. And my question about the small	
14	sample size was pertaining to the what's	
15	listed here as the private sector police of whom	
16	the OES found only 4,800 across the country; is	
17	that right?	
18	A Well, you say small sample size. The	
19	sample size is the number of establishments that	
20	were surveyed. It's very, very large. It's the	
21	largest sample size of any survey that I'm aware	
22	of, not even close. 1.2 million is the sample	

1674 What you're talking about is the number of 1 employees that were identified through that very 3 large sample size of 1.2 million establishments. The number of private sector in postal -- excuse me -- police and sheriff's patrol officers is 5 quite small, 4,880, but you're able to estimate 6 7 that with a high degree of -- of significance 8 because of the very large sample size. So these 9 are statistically significant. 10 And then the OES does publish the --11 the relative error in their estimates. They're 12 very low because of the very large sample size that's used. 13 14 Q Okay. 15 So the number of employees that are identified, that's not the sample size. 16 sample size is 1.2 million individual surveys. 17 18 I'm not here to quibble about the 19 economic terms. What I'm saying is, we're 20 dealing here only -- 62 percent of work -- of 21 workplaces were -- were -- 60 is -- purports to get coverage of 62 percent of --22

			1675
	1	A The American workforce.	
	2	Q The American workforce, correct. But	
	3	out of that, it found out of that 62 percent,	
	4	only 4,880 private sector employees. That's	
	5	my that's my point I'm driving at.	
	6	A And that's correct.	
	7	Q Because the post office has not offered	
	8	any individual workplaces and actual salaries of	
	9	any particular workers to compare the Postal	
	10	Police to; is that correct?	
	11	A Yeah. And the Postal Service that's	
	12	typical. The private sector comparability in	
	13	the in the statute doesn't say comparability	
	14	to firms, you know. It is private sector	
	15	comparability in general. So the Postal Service	
	16	looks at an occupation not for any particular	
	17	firm, but but across all firms and the average	
	18	salary for those. So this is consistent with the	
	19	way the Postal Service typically looks at at	
	20	private sector comparability.	
	21	Q Okay. Well, one of my other questions	
	22	about this was you testified yesterday that	
I			

		1676
1	fully 100 percent of the coverage was	
2	universities and hospitals, correct?	
3	A Yes.	
4	Q But	
5	A Private sector universities	
6	Q Correct.	
7	A and hospitals.	
8	Q But there was no discussion of rail,	
9	which we haven't we've only had the evidence	
10	from Amtrak, but there's other private rail	
11	companies also have police forces, don't they?	
12	A I'm not aware of that. And if they	
13	you know, Amtrak, I'm not sure how they're	
14	classified by OES. It could very well be that	
15	they are classified as public sector. I don't	
16	know.	
17	Q Okay. But you you would agree that	
18	no rail none of the rail companies are covered	
19	by this number, then?	
20	A No. All in universities and hospitals.	
21	Q Okay. And this number, also, is not	
22	broken down by locality, although that number	

		1677
1	could be obtained; is that right?	
2	A Yes, it could be obtained, but, no,	
3	it's not broken down by locality. It's a	
4	national number.	
5	Q Right. And the other thing about this	
6	mean data here we're still on Slide 7 the	
7	mean is across age groups; is that right?	
8	A The mean is the average salary across	
9	all workers within that occupation.	
10	Q Correct.	
11	A Yes.	
12	Q So from the most junior to the most	
13	senior?	
14	A All workers, yes.	
15	Q Correct. And I don't know if it's	
16	still up there, but is Union Exhibit 101 up	
17	there? This is a chart we received from the post	
18	office.	
19	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Where would we find	
20	that?	
21	MR. STEPHENS: There was one that was	
22	distributed yesterday.	

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1678
 1
               THE WITNESS: Give me a chance to find
 2
     it here.
 3
              MS. GONSALVES: It's this one.
               THE WITNESS: This only goes up to 65.
               MR. STEPHENS: Okay.
 6
               ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Yeah, I've got it
 7
     right here.
               THE WITNESS: This is all mine. Okay.
 9
               MR. STEPHENS: If you can't find it, I
10
     can just give him this copy.
11
               THE WITNESS: I know what you're
    referring to, so --
12
13
               MR. STEPHENS: Okay.
14
               THE WITNESS: -- if you just hand it to
15
    me.
              ARBITRATOR BJORK: Arlus --
16
17
              MR. STEPHENS: Yeah.
18
               THE WITNESS: Okay.
    BY MR. STEPHENS
19
20
               Now, when you're comparing to the PPO
    average salary of 53,000, isn't it correct that
21
22
    almost all the PPOs are at the very top step?
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		1679
1	A A high proportion of them are.	
2	Q Well, it is fair to say that, in	
3	Atlanta, 100 percent of them are?	
4	A Yes.	
5	Q 14 out of 14?	
6	A Uh-huh.	
7	Q And in Boston, 12 out of 13?	
8	A It looks like 13 out of 14.	
9	Q 13 out of 14. I'm sorry. And in	
10	Chicago, 18 out of 19?	
11	A Yes.	
12	Q And in St. Louis, 11 out of 13?	
13	A Uh-huh.	
14	Q And so on, including, in New York, 120	
15	out of the 145 are all at the top step?	
16	A That's what this shows, yes.	
17	Q And it's much the same for the other	
18	ones. So when you're comparing the the	
19	averages, if you're comparing to a national	
20	average, it would be your guess, would it not,	
21	that the national average for postal for	
22	patrol officers is not going to be as skewed	

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1680
     toward the top end of the scale as it is for
 1
     Postal Police Officers?
               I have no way of knowing that. I don't
     know what the distribution of private sector
    police officers are. I have no idea.
               But if it's --
               And it's unknowable, really, without
 8
     looking at --
 9
               So it's --
10
            -- information that we don't have
11
    available.
12
            So that's a limitation of this --
            This --
13
          Α
14
               -- comparison, then, correct?
              Well, limitation -- it is what it is.
15
    It's the distribution -- you know, the
16
    distribution is what the distribution is. I
    don't know how much different it is than the PPOA
    distribution.
19
20
               It's fair to say that probably not
21
    every police force has 384 -- is not 86 percent
22
    at the top step?
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		1681
1	A I have no way of knowing no way of	
2	knowing that.	
3	Q You don't know that?	
4	A I don't know that.	
5	Q Okay. If I can if we can move on	
6	just a couple of slides to well, actually, why	
7	don't we go to Slide 8 for a moment?	
8	A Okay.	
9	Q We're at Slide 8. So this suggests	
10	that although the mean for private sector police	
11	is 52,000, there's actually quite a range, going	
12	up to 74,940.	
13	So if I understand your testimony, it's	
14	impossible to know what the age distribution is	
15	among the officers who make up this private	
16	sector component; is that right?	
17	A Yes. There's no information on on	
18	the age distribution in the OES.	
19	Q Okay. So it could be that some of	
20	these private sector police forces pay all their	
21	workers, notwithstanding their age, a very high	
22	salary, or it could be that they actually the	

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1682
     range varies, and as one grows with seniority,
 1
     they approach the 90th percentile in terms of
     salary? It's impossible to know that, correct?
          Α
               Is there a question?
               It's mostly a point, but the question
     is whether it's correct.
          Α
               What's correct?
              Whether that's true, that it's
 9
     impossible --
10
          Α
              What's true?
11
            It's impossible --
          0
12
               I quess I don't know --
13
               -- to know from -- from this data?
14
          Α
               It -- OES has no information whatsoever
15
     about the age distribution of the employees
     involved.
16
17
               Okay. Take a second to go to slide
18
    number -- Slide No. 11. So my question here -- I
19
    quess first -- my first question is -- and I
20
    think this is repeating what you said earlier,
21
    but what -- what you've taken for this slide to
22
     show the panel is national data; is that right?
```

		1683
1	A It's national data, yes.	1000
2	Q And again, to reiterate, it's not	
3	broken out by level of seniority. It's just a	
4	mean; is that right? The age of the workforce,	
5	the the length of time length of service in	
6	a particular police force is not separately	
7	measured?	
8	A Tenure and age of of the workforce	
9	is not part of the National Compensation Survey.	
10	Q Okay. Now, we went back and dug a	
11	little bit into this into this data, and are	
12	you aware that there for example, in	
13	there's a let me step back for a moment.	
14	Just by way of example on looking at	
15	Union Exhibit 101, is it correct to say there's a	
16	fair number of PPOs employed in Los Angeles, 24,	
17	and in San Francisco and Oakland, 32; is that	
18	right?	
19	A Yes.	
20	Q There's far more employed there than	
21	there's employed in Atlanta or Memphis, for	
22	example, right?	

		1684
1	A Yes.	
2	Q And were you aware that in San	
3	Francisco and Los Angeles, based on this OES	
4	data, there's not a single Level 5 or a single	
5	Level 6 officer in either of those locations?	
6	A In the NCS data?	
7	Q This data, correct.	
8	A NCS. You said OES.	
9	Q The data	
10	A I was not aware of that, no.	
11	Q So, again, that's a possible limitation	
12	of using national data for this purpose?	
13	A Well, the Postal Service doesn't pay	
14	locality pay, so we're interested in the national	
15	wage rate. So, no, I don't see that as a	
16	limitation.	
17	Q But the post office operates the	
18	post office, of course, delivers mail in every	
19	state of the Union, correct?	
20	A They do.	
21	Q Fargo, North Dakota, Minot, North	
22	Dakota, just as it does in San Francisco or Los	
1		

		1685
1	Angeles, correct?	
2	A Correct.	
3	Q But it doesn't employ Postal Police	
4	Officers in all those locations, does it?	
5	A Correct.	
6	Q Okay. Let me turn you to Slide No. 12	
7	for a second, please. Now, I believe you	
8	testified that the you did not believe that	
9	the Service Contract Act is a minimum wage.	
10	Is that your testimony?	
11	A It doesn't represent a minimum wage in	
12	the terms of it's a minimum wage that that	
13	the contractor has to pay to its employees, but	
14	that that wage level itself is not based on	
15	any sort of minimum wage. It's the prevailing	
16	wage, which is the central tendency, the mean or	
17	the median of workers in that occupation in that	
18	particular locality.	
19	Q Right.	
20	A So in the in the sense it's not a	
21	minimum wage that you know, it doesn't	
22	represent the lowest wage that can be paid to	

1686 those workers in that -- that locality. 1 represents the mean or median wage of workers within that occupation in that locality. Well, the minimum wage is \$8.65 an hour 0 or whatever it is; is that right? It depends on where -- different localities have different minimum wages, yes. 0 But if the post office wanted to hire 9 police officers from a private firm, it would 10 have to pay the Service Contract Act minimum 11 wage, correct, or it -- better said, the 12 contractors it hired would have to pay those 13 police officers the Service Contract Act wage, 14 correct? And -- and the Postal Service does 15 Α employ the ABM security quards and -- as -- as 16 under -- and it has to pay at least the Service 17 18 Contract Act wages for those people. 19 Q Right. And then pays ABM a profit --20 profit amount on top of that so that ABM can make 21 money off of the deal, correct? 22 A Sure.

		1687
1	Q So but going back to the minimum	1007
2	wage, if if there's been discussion about	
3	the post office contracting out all of the police	
4	officer functions, and if it were to do so, it	
5	would it would have to employ contractors who	
6	would have to pay at least the service contract	
7	minimum, correct?	
8	A Yes.	
9	Q Okay. Now, one question one real	
10	quick on the fringe benefits.	
11	It's correct, isn't it, that the	
12	Department of Labor does not actually break out a	
13	separate fringe benefit for every classification?	
14	A It does not. It used to. It now	
15	employs a national a unitary fringe benefit	
16	rate that's applied to all occupations.	
17	Q Every occupation everywhere in the	
18	country, correct?	
19	A (Nodding.)	
20	Q So custodians in Minot, North Dakota	
21	get the same fringe benefit as a police officer	
22	in New York would get, correct?	

		1688
1	A Correct.	
2	Q So let me let's turn to Slide 15, if	
3	we could. Now, looking just at the wages for	
4	Police I, how did you get the the \$27.60 rate	
5	for PPOs?	
6	A That was on I'm looking for the	
7	exhibit. I think it's Exhibit No. 5, Tab No. 5.	
8	Q Okay. Now, you were present for	
9	Professor Belman's testimony, correct?	
10	A I was, yeah.	
11	Q And when Professor Belman did his	
12	exhibit, he did what he called a weighted	
13	average; isn't that right?	
14	A He did a weighted average, correct.	
15	Q And under that weighted average, he	
16	deduced that the the average annual service	
17	contract wage that would be the post office	
18	would be required to pay, assuming the same	
19	distribution of workers today, would be \$29.45 an	
20	hour; is that correct?	
21	A I I don't have it in front of me,	
22	but that sounds about right.	

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1689
              Okay. But the number you come up with
 1
    is less than that. First of all, it's $26 --
    before we get to the -- the shift differential,
    it's 26.88, correct?
              Right. And that represents an average
    across all those localities.
         Q
              Right. So -- but most of the PPOs, in
    fact, are in New York --
 9
         Α
              A very --
10
              -- correct?
11
         A -- large number of them are in New
    York, yes.
12
13
              In fact, it's correct that 100 -- a
    full third of the workforce is New York; is that
14
15
    right?
           That sounds about right.
16
           And New York's rate is $32?
17
         A Uh-huh.
18
19
              Which is about $14 more an hour than
20
    New Orleans, right? Based on your --
21
         A Yes.
22
         Q -- Exhibit 5.
```

```
1690
 1
          Α
               Uh-huh.
 2
               But for the purpose of this analysis,
     you've given them exactly the same weight?
          Α
               Right.
               How does that -- how is that
     illustrative of what -- of the Service Contract
     Act minimum?
          Α
               It's -- it represents the average
 9
    weight across the locations where PPOs are -- are
10
    employed.
11
              But if the post office --
12
              Dr. Belman chose to use a weighted
13
     average. I -- I used a simple average. There's
14
    no correct methodological way, and I -- a simple
15
     average across the -- the wage -- the localities
16
    where they work is -- is the correct way to do it
     in my opinion.
17
               Well, it does help to reduce the number
18
19
     significantly; is that right?
20
               I'm not sure how significant it is,
21
    but --
          Q Well, let's --
22
```

		1691
1	A yeah, it does reduce	
2	Q Let's go through the let's go	
3	through where the low numbers are.	
4	\$19 dollars in Atlanta, correct?	
5	A Yes.	
6	Q And there's 14 PPOs in Atlanta, right?	
7	A Uh-huh.	
8	Q And then Memphis is a low one, I think.	
9	Memphis is 21, and there's 11 PPOs in Atlanta?	
10	A Fourteen.	
11	Q I'm counting 11 on my sheet. Maybe	
12	I'm	
13	A In Atlanta?	
14	Q No. In	
15	A Memphis is	
16	Q 14 in Atlanta and 11 in Memphis.	
17	A That's correct.	
18	Q And but in San Francisco, it's \$42,	
19	which is almost well over twice what what	
20	Atlanta is, but there's 32 in San Francisco.	
21	I mean, if the post office were to	
22	contract out the police functions, it would have	

		1692
1	to pay the police officers it would have to	
2	build into the contract enough money to pay the	
3	police officers the amount of money that Dr.	
4	Belman testified was the rate, not this number,	
5	correct?	
6	A But you're assuming that the the	
7	work that the Postal Service would be contracting	
8	for would be classified as Police I. We don't	
9	think it is.	
10	Q Oh, I understand. No, I	
11	A We think it's Guard II.	
12	Q Oh, I understand. I understand the	
13	position. I'm just my my question is only	
14	about this chart for now.	
15	A If if if the Postal Service were	
16	to contract out in those locations for Police	
17	Officer I positions that we don't believe	
18	currently exist, then it would pay the Service	
19	Contract Act wage you see there.	
20	Q Right. It would pay the service	
21	contract rates on Dr. Belman's or on this one?	
22	A It depends on how many people we	

		1693
1	employed. It's	
2	Q So if the choice were made to employ	
3	the same the same number in Atlanta, but to	
4	eliminate all of the New York, then, obviously,	
5	that would drive down the cost, right?	
6	A It's there there are lot of	
7	factors that would go into it. I it's hard to	
8	speculate how that would turn out.	
9	Q Now, I think going back to the the	
10	PowerPoint for a moment, it's correct, under the	
11	Service Contract Act, that it's a contractor	
12	cannot excuse failure to pay the minimum wage by	
13	borrowing, say, from maybe extra benefits it may	
14	pay the worker, correct?	
15	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Do you mean	
16	prevailing wage?	
17	MR. STEPHENS: The prevailing wage,	
18	correct.	
19	THE WITNESS: The prevailing wage has	
20	to be paid, yes. And then the benefits can be	
21	given either as an additional cash payment or	
22	benefits in kind, health benefits, pension	

		1694
1	benefits.	
2	BY MR. STEPHENS	
3	Q But you can't an employer cannot	
4	excuse compliance with failure to pay the minimum	
5	wage, the minimum wage set by the wage survey	
6	A Correct.	
7	Q by pointing to the fact that it	
8	pays the	
9	A Well, they can't pay, for example if	
10	the wage is \$25 an hour and the benefits are \$4	
11	an hour and the total is \$29, the Postal	
12	Service I mean, the employer cannot pay, say,	
13	\$5 an hour in benefits in kind and then reduce	
14	the wage, no.	
15	Q Right.	
16	A They have to pay the wage.	
17	Q Correct. That's the point I wanted to	
18	make. So let's go to Slide No. 16.	
19	Now, there was a lot of discussion	
20	yesterday about quit rates. And referring you	
21	back again to Union Exhibit 101 and I believe	
22	it also is indicative of some testimony you gave	

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1695
     yesterday -- most of the PPO workforce is --
 1
     has -- is in the -- is -- is looking at
     retirement; is that correct?
               We have -- I don't know what the
          А
     average age is, but -- but, you know, I would say
     the average age of PPOs is somewhere in the early
         So I guess they -- you could say they are
     approaching -- they're closer to the end of the
 9
     career than they are to the beginning of their
10
     career.
11
               And is it correct that under the --
          0
     under either FERS or SERS, there's incentive to
12
13
     remain at one's job, because if you leave before
     you hit the -- your early retirement age, you
14
15
    have to wait longer to get your accrued benefit;
     is that right?
16
17
               Yeah. And that would explain the
18
    voluntary quits, the resignations from the Postal
19
     Service, but what it doesn't explain is -- is
20
     the -- the -- the small number of PPOs that
21
     transfer to other agencies. If the PPO transfers
     to another federal agency, benefits-wise, it's
22
```

1696 They have no impact whatsoever on 1 their retirement. They have no impact whatsoever on the benefits they receive. They're in the same health plan. Their -- their leave balance is transferred over, sick leave and annual leave. They don't lose any credit in terms of leave accruals. So it's a seamless transfer, so that doesn't apply to transfers to other agencies. 9 And that's the other element of the quit rate. 10 But isn't it correct, actually, that --11 and it's not reflected in the numbers that we've 12 seen here -- but that the guit rate in the years 13 after 9/11, the early parts of the 2000s, the 14 level of -- the quit rate was so high it became a 15 cause for concern with the Inspection Service 16 management, correct? The quit rate in all of federal law 17 enforcement was a cause for concern after 2001. 18 19 In 2004, the OPM actually commissioned and 20 studied -- did a study on this, and it was a 21 report to Congress. And it was dealing with that 22 very issue, that since 2001, there was a lot of

1697 upheaval and turmoil among all law enforcement 1 officers within the federal sector and -- and they were looking at ways to address that. Now, I've looked -- they have an 5 appendix in -- in that report that has nothing but information on quit rates by -- by grade level, by agency and -- and the Postal Police quit rates fall within the range of what we were 9 seeing with the federal -- other federal 10 agencies. So, no, I wouldn't say that it was 11 unusual -- unusually high. 12 It was, you know, something --13 something that occurred after 2001 with the 14 creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 15 the renewed emphasis or increased emphasis on -on security, the TSA, the start-up of the TSA, 16 the Air Marshals program. There was just a lot 17 of -- a lot of change, a lot of upheaval, and, 18 19 you know, that was reflected in -- in transfers 20 and quit rates across all federal agencies, not 21 just the Postal Service. So, no, I wouldn't say 22 it was unusual.

		1698
1	Q It was and I think you made the	
2	point that I was hoping you'd make, that there	
3	was actually quite a lot and it was the same as	
4	all other agencies?	
5	A Right. And that's since settled down.	
6	Q Oh, it has, because if you	
7	A Considerably.	
8	Q look at the Slide 17, the numbers	
9	we see here are mostly Great Recession numbers;	
10	isn't that correct?	
11	A Well, they're numbers from 2008 since	
12	the last contract, and and over that period of	
13	time, yes, we had a financial crisis, the	
14	recession.	
15	Q Not not much hiring going on for	
16	even for police officers; is that correct?	
17	A Certainly not by the Postal Service. I	
18	can't speak to other agencies or other	
19	jurisdictions.	
20	Q Okay. So that's but that's the	
21	numbers that the panel has on on the quit	
22	rates are mostly Great Recession numbers?	

1699 Right. And I think that's why it's 1 2 important to reference those to -- to -- to other 3 quit rates, and that's why I included the federal sector on the next slide, just to give a point of reference. And the federal sector isn't normally 7 what you would think of when you, you know, think 8 of large numbers of people leaving because they're dissatisfied with the pay and benefits. 9 10 But even there, the quit rates over the same 11 period of time are -- are multiples higher than 12 they are for Postal Police Officers. 13 Is it fair to say on Slide 18 that the Postal Police Officer quit rate is far higher 14 15 than any other postal unit measured here? I think far higher would be a stretch, 16 but they are slightly higher. Nonetheless, 17 they're all incredibly small. 18 19 Just another point that -- question, 20 and I -- I'm going to make a point. 21 But on the private sector and federal 22 sector JOLTS data, this is across professions and

		1700
1	is not limited to police officers, correct?	
2	A That's correct.	
3	Q Now, going back to Slide 16 for a	
4	moment and referring you back to Union 101, the	
5	flip side of quit rates data is is hire data,	
6	correct?	
7	A No, I wouldn't say that's the flip side	
8	of it.	
9	Q Well, the question is: Looking at it	
10	from a market perspective and assuming	
11	assuming you have I mean, the theory behind	
12	the use of the quit rate data here, I take it, is	
13	one that assumes rational actors in the labor	
14	markets are going to move where their skills and	
15	wherever will take them, right?	
16	A Uh-huh.	
17	Q So now we have here made the point	
18	that we have an aging workforce, but in terms of	
19	new hiring, the the wages should be	
20	competitive to bring people in, correct?	
21	A Sure. Not just for Postal Police, but	
22	in general, yes.	

```
1701
 1
               Correct. And you've mentioned -- you
     testified yesterday that the hiring -- for
     whatever policy reasons, the Inspection Service
     has hired PPOs from the other crafts, correct?
               And that's been the practice for many
     years, I understand.
              And you're also aware, of course, that
          Q
 8
     custodians for the post office make more money
 9
     than police officers?
10
          Α
               They absolutely do not make more money
11
     than Postal Police Officers --
12
               Well --
               -- at the top step. They just don't.
13
14
    And if you -- they -- it's -- that's just a
15
     fallacy. They do not make more money.
              Well, we had testimony from Bill
16
     Scarpello. You were present for that, correct?
17
18
               I was present for that.
19
               And he, at that point, took -- when he
20
     left last year, he took -- ended up, when he
21
    became a full-time custodian, it was about a
22
     $200 difference, correct?
```

		1702
1	A Right.	
2	Q And since that time, had the APWU has	
3	gotten a the percentage and COLAs, correct?	
4	A The APWU is under a new collective	
5	bargaining agreement. Under that collective	
6	bargaining agreement, there was two-year wage	
7	freeze. In November of 2012, the APWU received a	
8	1 percent general wage increase, and they	
9	received COLA increases in 2013, correct	
10	Q And they received again	
11	A under the terms of the new	
12	agreement.	
13	Q And again in 2014, correct?	
14	A And in 2014, yes.	
15	Q Okay. And are you aware that at	
16	locations where the post office has sought to	
17	hire new Postal Police Officers, it had a	
18	difficult time hiring anyone because people would	
19	have to take a pay cut to leave their other	
20	postal job to become a police officer?	
21	A I I am not aware of that at all, and	
22	I I've got nothing to say on that. I've not	

```
1703
    heard that, so --
 1
 2
               Okay.
          Α
               We just -- we just recruited a class,
              I do know that -- that a class of 20
 5
     was -- was -- just graduated, because we actually
    happened to be out at the academy the day they
     graduated. So, you know, I didn't hear that they
    had any problem whatsoever recruiting that class.
 9
     I understand they recruited a new class of 20
10
     or -- or so. So I -- I don't know where the idea
11
     that we have trouble or are unable to recruit
12
    people into PPO jobs comes from.
13
     understanding, we have not had that problem.
14
          Q
               Okay. And, again, I guess I'll refer
     you to Slide 21 for a moment. And I think the --
15
     the age -- the year distribution here, of
16
17
     course -- I'll just make the same point I made
18
     earlier, that had the quit rate data that you
19
     used for years going back further than 2010, it
20
     would have shown a different number for the PPO
21
     quit rate; is that correct?
22
             Well, you know, quit rates do vary
          Α
```

```
1704
     slightly over time, so, yeah, I mean, it's --
 1
     every year -- you can see here each of those four
     years is different.
               Right. But these four years are all --
     these four years for the PPO quit rate are all
     Great Recession years?
          Α
               No, they're not. I mean, the recession
 8
     was in 2008, ended in 2009. The recovery's been
 9
     slow, but there has been a recovery since then.
10
     So I think it's just, you know, factually
11
     inaccurate to say it was the Great Recession
     in -- that's continuing to this day.
12
13
               I thought that was Mr. Whiteman's
14
     testimony.
15
               Well, the Great Recession was in 2008
     and 2009, yes, but the -- we're -- since then,
16
     there -- there's been a recovery, so...
17
18
          Q
              Okay.
19
               And I'd like to point out here that in
20
     2000 and 2001, we were also in -- in a --
21
     actually in a recession at that period of time,
22
     so...
```

		1705
1	Q It was a stock market the stock	
2	market crisis, though.	
3	A Recession has a very specific	
4	definition, and and there was technically a	
5	recession in 2000 and 2001 by that definition.	
6	There was not in 2010 through 2013.	
7	Q Okay. Okay. Well, I'll just I'll	
8	just I think we can maybe if we disagree	
9	about the definition of recession, perhaps we can	
10	agree that the unemployment rate was different	
11	during these time periods?	
12	A Sure. We can agree on that.	
13	Q Okay. And on Slide 23, I had a	
14	question about the the the box on the	
15	right, the other bargaining.	
16	And I believe you said I read your	
17	testimony about I can't remember what the	
18	promotion was, but I know the lateral was	
19	considered lateral positions being like an	
20	equivalent position in another craft; is that	
21	right?	
22	A Yes. Yes.	

		1706
1	Q And for the Letter Carriers, that was a	
2	city carrier position; is that right?	
3	A City Carrier Grade 1 position, yes.	
4	Q And how about what were the lower	
5	level?	
6	A Lower level are are custodians and a	
7	Mail Handler Grade 4.	
8	Q Okay. The were a number of people who	
9	left, at least nine of them, to become	
10	custodians?	
11	A Right. And many of those took pay cuts	
12	to do so.	
13	Q Let me go ahead and move up to Slide	
14	27. And we have not had our own witness testify	
15	about bargaining history, and we had hoped to	
16	have Jim Sauber from the Letter Carriers, but he	
17	was unable to as you know from the because	
18	of the markup of the Senate bill.	
19	But during the 2000 the last	
20	interest arbitration, the Letter Carriers'	
21	attorney, Keith Secular, presented an opening	
22	brief to the panel that had an alternative view	

		1707
1	of the bargaining history; is that fair to say?	
2	A I was there. Yes.	
3	MR. STEPHENS: Okay. I'd like to	
4	introduce just since we don't have a witness	
5	on this, to introduce for the panel's benefit	
6	the that brief, which, in the background	
7	section, contains an alternate view of bargaining	
8	history at the post office.	
9	BY MR. STEPHENS	
10	Q Is it correct to say that the not	
11	the other postal unions don't necessarily agree	
12	with the facts as the conclusions as laid out	
13	in your testimony?	
14	A Which conclusions? I guess I'm not	
15	Q Well, the conclusion that every	
16	arbitrator has found a wage premium, for example,	
17	by postal employees.	
18	A I don't think I said that every	
19	arbitrator's found a wage premium.	
20	Q Okay.	
21	A I said that arbitrators have	
22	consistently many arbitrators have found the	

		1708
1	existence of a wage premium.	
2	Q Okay.	
3	MS. GONSALVES: And, typically, I would	
4	make an objection here about relevance and all	
5	that sort of stuff, but I the panel can give	
6	it whatever weight it believes is due.	
7	MR. STEPHENS: And I'm offering it	
8	largely because it's, I think, very well written,	
9	and it it does give an alternate view of	
10	background that the because of the inability	
11	to have our own witness here, we were unable to	
12	provide that.	
13	MS. GONSALVES: I'll just proffer for	
14	the record that the Postal Service had its own	
15	presentations in each of these cases. We	
16	submitted our own briefs and appendices on this	
17	issue, and I'm not going to burden the panel with	
18	copies of all the Postal Service's briefs and the	
19	transcripts from the proceedings, but it is what	
20	it is, unless the panel wants it.	
21	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Not me.	
22	THE WITNESS: I've suffered through	

```
1709
     this already.
 1
    BY MR. STEPHENS
               I'm not going to go through all -- all
     of these in detail. Is it fair to say you've
     selected from these opinions the points that are
    helpful to the post office's case in -- in this
 7
    proceeding?
               I think I've characterized accurately
 9
     the -- the message that arbitrator was conveying.
10
               Well, let's go -- let's go through a
11
     couple of them.
12
          Α
               Okay.
13
              And let's start off with David Vaughn
14
     from 1996 in Slide 34. And this is Tab 12 in --
15
               MS. GONSALVES: Volume 3.
               MR. STEPHENS: Volume 3, Tab 12.
16
     I'm going to be looking at page 11, Arbitrator
17
    Vaughn's decision.
18
19
               ARBITRATOR BJORK: Page 11?
20
               MR. STEPHENS: Yes.
21
              ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Arlus, what page did
22
     you say?
```

```
1710
 1
               MR. STEPHENS: Page 11.
 2
    BY MR. STEPHENS
              And, Joe, I believe you testified
     yesterday that every arbitrator has rejected
     explicitly any notion of internal comparability.
     Is that -- was that your testimony yesterday?
          Α
               I don't know if I said every
 8
     arbitrator.
 9
              Okay. I thought you made a point of
10
    mentioning --
11
          Α
             That it's been --
12
              -- David Vaughn's --
13
              -- a consistent message -- has been a
14
    consistent message across arbitrations.
15
              But you cited Vaughn as -- as one of
    the arbitrators who supported that message; is
16
17
     that correct?
               I may have. I'd have to look at the
19
    transcript.
20
               Well, isn't it correct that Arbitrator
21
    Vaughn actually rejected the post office's
22
    argument on this point?
```

		1711
1	A Rejected what argument? The internal	
2	equity should not be considered?	
3	Q Correct. Just let's just read it	
4	into the let's just read it. And I'm this	
5	is the the the first full paragraph. If I	
6	can direct you to the third sentence, and if you	
7	could just read that into the record.	
8	A Okay. Just one moment here. The third	
9	sentence in in what where?	
10	Q On	
11	A Page 11?	
12	Q Yeah. The paragraph on page 11.	
13	A Okay. The first paragraph. Okay.	
14	Third sentence: The Postal Service argues that	
15	the external comparability directed by the act is	
16	the exclusive standard which PRA interest	
17	arbitrators may consider. I am not persuaded.	
18	Q And does it go on to explain why he	
19	thinks internal comparability actually could be	
20	appropriate? I mean, is it fair to say that	
21	if you can just read into the record the last	
22	sentence in that paragraph.	

		1712
1	A On page 12?	
2	Q Yes, sir.	
3	A Thus, I conclude that the panel is not	
4	precluded from considering internal equity as a	
5	standard in determining the proper resolution of	
6	the debate dispute.	
7	Q Is it fair to say that Arbitrator	
8	Vaughn, then, is not someone who supports the	
9	theory that the post office posited yesterday?	
10	A Well, you know, it depends on how you	
11	look at how they consider internal equity. I	
12	mean, I I was referring to Vaughn to the	
13	the Mail Handlers' demand for a catch-up for the	
14	APWU, that their wages ought to be set equivalent	
15	to that of the APWU, that there was some sort of	
16	internal equity that demanded that. And he did	
17	reject that. He did reject the catch-up, and	
18	that's what I was referring to.	
19	Q So let's just think let's just	
20	then maybe we should go back and figure out	
21	what exactly the testimony was from yesterday,	
22	what the proper testimony is.	

		1713
1	It's correct, then, that Arbitrator	
2	Fleischli is not at all the only arbitrator who	
3	thinks internal comparability is appropriate for	
4	interest arbitrations?	
5	A Well, you know, I think what Fleischli	
6	did was different. And and and maybe I'm	
7	not conveying this the proper way, but internal	
8	equity where a union demands that they be paid	
9	equivalent or or that their wages be set based	
10	on the wages of other bargaining unit employees,	
11	strict comparability, that the wages ought to be	
12	equal, that's what the Mail Handlers were arguing	
13	in front of Vaughn, that they were entitled to	
14	catch up to the wages that they had lost in	
15	previous agreements to those of the APWU.	
16	Now, did does that mean that	
17	arbitrations arbitrators don't look at	
18	at at relative standing among the bargaining	
19	units in fashioning their award? Maybe. But	
20	but what I was saying was that, you know, demand	
21	for a catch-up and for strict pay comparability	
22	with another bargaining unit was rejected by	

```
1714
 1
    Arbitrator Vaughn.
 2
               Well, on that point, what was the
    purpose of your presentation yesterday in all
     these other arbitration decisions?
               It was to provide some context to --
     to -- for this proceeding in terms of the Union's
     demand for comparability, internal
 8
     comparability --
 9
          0
              Well --
10
          Α
            -- and --
11
               But if the argument is that these --
          Q
12
               MS. GONSALVES: Wait, wait.
13
               MR. STEPHENS: I'm sorry.
               MS. GONSALVES: I don't think the
14
    witness was finished. And you've done it a few
15
     times, and I haven't said anything. But I'd like
16
     you to just give --
17
18
               MR. STEPHENS: Sure.
19
               MS. GONSALVES: -- him a chance to
20
     finish his answer before you ask the next
21
    question.
               THE WITNESS: So it was to provide some
22
```

1715 context with interest arbitration history on how 1 previous arbitration panels have dealt with the issues that are before this panel. BY MR. STEPHENS But doesn't that undercut your argument that comparability is actually something that is an irrelevant concern here? А That -- I'm not sure I'm -- I don't 9 understand the question. Could you repeat that? 10 On the one hand, you were arguing 11 that -- that comparability is irrelevant, but on the other hand, we spent an hour-and-a-half or so 12 13 talking about the bargaining history of other 14 unions at the post office, and the -- the revised 15 proposal that the post office is offering here is that the panel should award what the other 16 arbitrators awarded. 17 18 Α Those are two different things. 19 mean, internal comparability is city letter -- or 20 excuse me -- Postal Police Officers ought to be 21 paid the same as city letter carriers or that --22 that -- you know, in this case, Mail Handlers

1716 ought to be paid the same as APWU. That's strict 1 2 pay comparability. That's been rejected by many 3 arbitrators. Let's go to another decision that was cited yesterday on this point, and that was the Collins award from Slide No. 37. 7 MS. GONSALVES: I object to the 8 characterization of this award being cited as on 9 this point. 10 BY MR. STEPHENS 11 Why did you cite the Collins award Q 12 yesterday? What was the purpose of discussing the Collins award? 13 14 Α It was -- it followed Fleischli. He --15 he -- Arbitrator Collins, in that award -- the Union was arguing for -- for upgrade -- an 16 upgrade, and -- and based on the Fleischli award, 17 18 the Union argued that -- that -- that ITAS or ISC 19 bargaining unit employees were entitled to -- to 20 pay increases on the basis of internal equity, 21 and he rejected them. 22 Q Well, if I can direct you to -- this is

		1717
1	Tab No. 14. And page 8 of the of the Collins	
2	award. And you see the paragraph in the middle	
3	of the page beginning with "the APWU contends"?	
4	A Uh-huh.	
5	Q If I can direct you down one, two,	
6	three I think it's the fourth sentence,	
7	beginning with the word "of course."	
8	A All right.	
9	Q And if you can read that into the	
10	record, please.	
11	A Of course, if Postal Service wages and	
12	benefits fell absolutely below the wages and	
13	benefits of private sector employees, the Postal	
14	Reorganization Reorganization Act would	
15	require some correction. However, that is not	
16	the situation here. There is considerable	
17	evidence in the record on the issue of whether	
18	the ISC employees enjoy a substantial wage and	
19	benefit differential with with respect to	
20	their private sector counterparts. Whether that	
21	differential is anywhere near as great as the 14	
22	percent the Service claims is very problematical.	
l		

1718 However, the chairman is convinced that the ISC 1 employees generally enjoy some differential and that even if the employees in computer programming do not, there is no persuasive evidence if their wages and benefits are less than their private sector programs. Okay. Let's go to the next slide, 0 8 Slide No. 38. I believe -- there's been a fair 9 number -- fair amount of discussion of this -- of 10 this award, and I want -- I'd like to ask you a 11 couple of questions about it. 12 First of all, you -- you referenced 13 yesterday the -- Professor Belman's testimony 14 about upgrades, and I believe you suggested he 15 was incorrect in saying that there was -- that the Goldberg panel awarded upgrades? 16 No, I didn't say that. Professor 17 18 Belman indicated that Arbitrator Goldberg issued 19 a wage package for the entire bargaining unit 20 that didn't call it an upgrade, but included 21 what -- what was essentially an upgrade. That -that's just factually incorrect. There were some 22

		1719
1	upgrades awarded by Arbitrator Goldberg, and I	
2	think I mentioned this yesterday, some skilled	
3	programmers I mean, skilled maintenance	
4	positions, tractor-trailer drivers, electronic	
5	technicians, others who whose wages were at	
6	market, and they were they were given an	
7	upgrade based on comparability grounds and	
8	external comparability basis.	
9	There was also an upgrade that was	
10	given to Grade 4, a grade it was a settlement	
11	of a dispute, a long-standing dispute over the	
12	classification of mail processors. And I think	
13	we can find	
14	Q Yes, on page 4 of Tab 15.	
15	MS. GONSALVES: This is the main award	
16	or the supplemental award?	
17	MR. STEPHENS: The main award.	
18	THE WITNESS: Yeah. And there he	
19	awards that, but I would	
20	BY MR. STEPHENS	
21	Q But he is it fair to say that he	
22	awarded it based on what he claimed what he	

		1720
1	found were changed expanding duties and	1720
2	responsibilities?	
3	A He if you'd look at page 14 of the	
4	supplemental award so go to the back. And	
5	and page 14, where he expands on the	
6	Q Well, I my question was pertaining	
7	to I had a question about page 4 of the main	
8	award. And my question was: Is it correct to	
9	say that Arbitrator Goldberg awarded a pay	
10	upgrade to those two positions based on evidence	
11	of expanding duties and responsibilities? Is	
12	that a correct statement?	
13	A Based on the two Mittenthal national	
14	level arbitration awards and certain other	
15	evidence dealing with expanding duties and	
16	responsibilities, the mail processor and senior	
17	mail processor position, the panel has concluded	
18	that this contentious matter, which is the	
19	subject of hundreds of grievances in the field,	
20	should be brought to closure in order to improve	
21	the labor relations climate between the parties.	
22	And if you go back to page 14 of the	

1721 supplemental award, he expands on that, and he 1 makes it clear that this was not -- had nothing to do with expanding duties and responsibilities. It was a settlement of -- he said hundreds there, but it was literally thousands of grievances, and he mentions that at the page -- top of 14. These upgrades were not based on a 8 conclusion that mail processors and senior mail 9 processors are entitled to a one pay level 10 upgrade -- he was very clear about that -- a 11 matter on which the parties are sharply divided 12 and on -- and on which I express no opinion. 13 Rather, it was my judgment that the dispute 14 concerning the appropriate pay level for these 15 employees, which has divided the parties for approximately 20 years and which is the subject 16 of thousands of pending grievances, should be terminated. I --18 19 0 So --20 -- don't think you can be any more 21 clear than that that --22 So Arbitrator Goldberg did not award an Q

```
1722
    upgrade based on comparability at all, even
 1
    private sector comparability?
            He settled a dispute.
          Α
               Is that permitted under the PRA in
     the --
               This --
          Α
            -- post office --
          Α
               This wasn't the wage package. This
 9
    wasn't the wage -- this is for a subset of
10
    employees in the APWU in one particular
11
    occupation where there was a long-standing
12
     classification dispute whether they were Grade 4
13
     or Grade 5. He settled that dispute.
14
              But not based on comparability grounds,
15
     correct?
               This has nothing to do with
16
     comparability. The --
17
            Okay. That's --
18
19
               -- comparability is in the wage package
20
    that he awarded, and in his wage package, he did
21
     indicate that Postal Service employees, in
    general, receive a wage premium, and he awarded
22
```

```
1723
    a -- a pay package that reflected that finding.
 1
 2
               MS. GONSALVES: Arlus, I'm wondering --
    we're almost an hour into cross. Do you think it
    might be a good time to take a break or --
              MR. STEPHENS: If the witness wants
    one.
 7
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: I think everyone
 8
    might like one. Let's --
 9
               THE WITNESS: The witness would like
10
    one, yes.
11
              MR. STEPHENS: Okay. The witness --
12
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Ten minutes.
13
              (Brief recess.)
14
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Okay. Ready to
    proceed, please.
15
16
    BY MR. STEPHENS
              I just had one more question for you
17
    regarding the Goldberg award.
18
19
         A Yes.
20
           And that's -- let's see. The
    supplemental opinion -- again, this is Tab 15.
21
22
    It's a supplemental opinion at page 11.
```

		1724
1	A Okay.	
2	Q Now, is it correct that in that case,	
3	the post office made several arguments about its	
4	financial condition?	
5	A It did, yes.	
6	Q And it argued that the the long-term	
7	and short-term referred to the structural deficit	
8	should be factored into in the arbitration	
9	award; is that right?	
10	A That's correct.	
11	Q And that Arbitrator Goldberg largely	
12	rejected that argument; is that correct?	
13	A I don't think I would agree necessarily	
14	with that characterization. He did say he did	
15	not disagree that there was a long-term	
16	structural problem facing the Postal Service.	
17	What he did say was that for for many parts of	
18	that problem, it was a congressional issue and	
19	not something that an interest arbitrator	
20	interest arbitrator could address.	
21	Q Okay. And, again, the central focus of	
22	Arbitrator Goldberg's award was comparability; is	

		1725
1	that right?	1720
2	A Correct.	
3	Q And on page 11, the paragraph beginning	
4	under analysis, he says, the Postal	
5	Reorganization Act provides for comparable wages	
6	and benefits and does not condition that	
7	comparability on the long-term financial health	
8	of the Postal Service; is that correct?	
9	A The PRA is silent on financial	
10	condition of the Postal Service.	
11	Q Now, there's a bill in Congress,	
12	though, that would make the financial status	
13	relevant to to comparability or relevant to	
14	that consideration; is that right?	
15	A I don't know if the the current bill	
16	in Congress includes that. I know it's been	
17	discussed.	
18	Q Okay.	
19	A It's also worth noting that the unions	
20	have our major unions, at least, have	
21	indicated that that is that language is	
22	unnecessary since arbitrators routinely consider	

```
1726
 1
     the financial condition of the Postal Service in
     its awards. I know that's the official position
     of the APWU and I believe some of the other
     larger unions.
               Let me direct you to Slide 40, please.
     Isn't it correct that at no time during this
     interest arbitration proceeding before Arbitrator
 8
     Fishgold did anyone make the argument that
 9
     1003(c) provided the correct standard for
10
     comparability?
11
               I -- you -- please repeat that.
                                                 I --
12
               Sure. Let's go back -- you remember
    discussion about 39 U.S.C. 1003(a), correct?
13
14
    That's the statute providing for private sector
15
     comparability, right?
16
               Right. Right.
              And as you recall, the Union's argument
17
18
     is that the correct comparability statute is 39
19
     U.S.C. 1003(c); is that correct?
20
               Correct.
21
             The whole issue about any investigative
     authority?
22
```

		1727
1	A Right.	
2	Q Under 18 U.S.C. 3061, correct?	
3	A Yes.	
4	Q At no time during the 2008 proceeding	
5	before Arbitrator Fishgold was that argument ever	
6	made; is that correct?	
7	A The specific reference to 1003(c) was	
8	not made. However, the Union did argue very	
9	strenuously that the proper comparison for Postal	
10	Police Officers was federal were federal	
11	sector or public sector police.	
12	So, yeah, I mean, did they reference	
13	1003(c)? No. But did they say their	
14	comparability ought to be to federal police	
15	officers? Yes, they did. They made that that	
16	argument very clear.	
17	Q And did they make that argument because	
18	they because of the dearth of private sector	
19	comparables for private sector police?	
20	A Well, I don't know what the the	
21	rationale for why they made the argument was. I	
22	know what was made.	

		1728
1	Q But there was no legal argument made	
2	I mean, just if we can get clarity no legal	
3	argument was made that 1003(c) provided the	
4	correct measure for comparability; is that	
5	correct?	
6	A I don't recall 1003(c) being mentioned	
7	in that proceeding.	
8	Q Okay. And just going to Slide 41 for a	
9	moment, these were your conclusions; is that	
10	right?	
11	A Yes. Well, they're what I believe are	
12	the precedents that have been established over 35	
13	years of interest arbitration history that may be	
14	relevant to this panel.	
15	Q Well, let's go through them one at a	
16	time. On the first bullet point, I believe you	
17	said, actually, that not every arbitrator has	
18	found a wage premium; is that right?	
19	A Not every arbitrator has made a finding	
20	in the award of a wage premium, explicitly	
21	addressed the wage premium.	
22	Q Has any arbitrator ever awarded a pay	

		1729
1	cut to any postal employee?	
2	A Yes.	
3	Q When when did that happen?	
4	A Three times in this last round of	
5	negotiations.	
6	Q For new hires?	
7	A No. For for non-career city	
8	letter carriers had their wage cut wages cut	
9	between 27 and 32 percent.	
10	Q Non-career employees?	
11	A Non-career employees. Future career	
12	employees, which you're referring to, will come	
13	in at a lower wage, but but there were	
14	there were employees that got their wages cut.	
15	There are employees on the rolls today that are	
16	working for less than they were before the	
17	arbitration award.	
18	Q Okay. This last round?	
19	A Yes.	
20	Q The private sector on the second	
21	bullet point one other I want to ask a	
22	question about an earlier one. One moment,	

		1730
1	please. The bullet point regarding private	
2	sector comparability mandate applies to PPOs,	
3	that just comes from the Fishgold award; is	
4	that	
5	A It is if you there was a very	
6	early interest arbitration in 1978 with one of	
7	the predecessors to the PPOA. There was no	
8	language in there on private sector	
9	comparability. Outside of that, the only	
10	interest arbitration award we have with the PPOA	
11	was the Fishgold report, and, yes, he did he	
12	did say that private sector comparability applied	
13	to PPOs.	
14	Q But without anyone making a	
15	presentation regarding 39 U.S.C. 1003(c); is that	
16	correct?	
17	MS. GONSALVES: Asked and answered.	
18	BY MR. STEPHENS	
19	Q Is that correct?	
20	A There was no discussion as far as I	
21	know of a 1003(c) argument in the Fishgold	
22	proceeding.	

```
1731
 1
               Now, the last bullet point, internal
     comparability with other bargaining units is --
     is not appropriate; is that --
          Α
               It's --
               Is it fair to say that that's more
     controversial than -- than the testimony was
 7
     yesterday?
               I -- I -- I don't think so.
                                             I think
 9
     that, you know, many -- many times, unions have
10
    asked for catch-up with other bargaining units to
11
    have their pay restored to the level received by
12
     other bargaining units, and each time that
13
     argument has come up, it's been rejected.
14
          0
               Okay. Let's go to Slide 44. I believe
15
     you testified yesterday that this 1991 agreement
     is where the pay parity was first broken with the
16
    APWU and NALC; is that correct?
17
18
          Α
               That's correct.
19
               And the union officers, instead of a
20
    wage increase, just bargained for lump sum
21
    payments; is that right?
22
         A That's correct.
```

		1732
1	Q And is it correct that the officers on	
2	the bargaining committee were all promoted to	
3	sergeant within a year of that negotiation?	
4	A I have no idea.	
5	Q And that the the FPPO is was	
6	decertified by the membership right after that	
7	agreement; is that correct?	
8	A Right after they ratified that	
9	agreement.	
10	Q Okay. And, in fact, the the former	
11	officers, the post office used them against the	
12	Postal Police in for in the subsequent	
13	negotiations; is that is that are you aware	
14	of that?	
15	A I've never heard that.	
16	Q Okay. Now, Slide 45, the 1994 report,	
17	was before Section 1003(c) was even enacted; is	
18	that correct?	
19	A I believe that I I don't know. I	
20	think it was 1996 we heard testimony.	
21	Q Yes, sir.	
22	A I don't speak from personal	

```
1733
    experience -- personal knowledge, but I think I
 1
    heard it testified that it was 1996 that that was
 3
     received.
           And that was after this report; is that
     correct?
               1994 was before 1996.
          Q Okay.
               (Cell phone interruption.)
 9
               MS. GONSALVES: Please silence all
10
    electronic devices.
11
    BY MR. STEPHENS
12
           Now, Slide 46 for a moment.
               You testified that collective
13
    bargaining agreements can be the result of --
14
     assuming a perfect market, each side gets its
15
    priorities. Is that -- is that a fair summation
16
     of your testimony yesterday?
17
               I don't -- I don't think I testified to
18
          Α
19
     that, but -- but in a collective bargaining
20
    process, yes, it's an agreement. Both sides get
21
     some of what they want and some of what they
22
    don't want. That's the essence of negotiation.
```

		1734
1	Q That's assuming a market that does not	
2	have inefficiencies in it; is that would that	
3	be correct to say?	
4	A I think an agreement between two	
5	parties, they they come to some agreement	
6	regardless of whether or not there's free and	
7	full competition. I don't know what the	
8	Q But there is differing when the post	
9	office bargains with the Letter Carriers, the	
10	Letter Carriers have loads of experts they bring	
11	into the proceedings; is that is that a	
12	correct statement?	
13	A Not not generally in negotiations.	
14	Q No, in	
15	A Negotiations are generally just the	
16	Q But interest arbitrations.	
17	A parties themselves.	
18	Q In interest arbitration.	
19	A In interest arbitration, it has been	
20	the case that that the rural that the city	
21	letter carriers do bring in experts. That was	
22	less so, I think, in this last round of this	

```
1735
     last interest arbitration. We did have testimony
 1
     from experts, but -- but I don't think --
     compared to previous arbitrations, it was
     relatively limited.
               The Letter Carriers, among other things
     own a building, their own headquarters building;
     isn't that correct?
            A very nice one, too.
 9
            A very nice one.
10
          Α
              Yes.
11
               Just about a block or two from the
          0
    Capitol building?
12
13
               It's got to be worth a fortune.
14
          Q
               So when -- when they approach
15
    bargaining, they're able to make presentations in
     interest arbitration more readily than a smaller
16
     union without much resources: is that -- would
17
     that be a fair statement to make?
19
               MS. GONSALVES: I -- you know, a lot
20
    of -- couple questions here. I just -- personal
21
     knowledge, relevance, all of these things are
22
     floating out there, so --
```

		1736
1	MR. STEPHENS: I will	
2	MS. GONSALVES: I don't think that this	
3	necessarily is the correct witness to be	
4	testifying about the relative economic power of	
5	various unions.	
6	MR. STEPHENS: Well, there's testimony	
7	yesterday that assumed an efficient economy in	
8	bargaining, where each side gets what it wants	
9	and get its own priorities based on so my	
10	question is relating to	
11	MS. GONSALVES: To tell you the truth,	
12	I think that's a mischaracterization of what the	
13	testimony yesterday was. I don't think there was	
14	testimony on that point.	
15	THE WITNESS: I did not testify to	
16	that.	
17	BY MR. STEPHENS	
18	Q I thought you said each side gets it's	
19	priorities. For example, the	
20	A I said, over time, the different	
21	bargaining priorities of the various unions	
22	demerged and	

		1737
1	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: But	
2	THE WITNESS: and those those	
3	bargaining priorities were different than than	
4	other units.	
5	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Let's let's try	
6	and move forward. I think that's such a basic	
7	point that we hardly need to be reminded of it.	
8	BY MR. STEPHENS	
9	Q Okay. So the point was, in terms of	
10	the the 1994 agreement, ECI minus one was a	
11	as you testified yesterday, was a proposal to	
12	reduce wages over time; is that right?	
13	A No, it was not. And I never testified	
14	to that.	
15	Q I thought	
16	A ECI minus one, as I testified to	
17	yesterday, was was was the embodiment of	
18	the moderate restraint doctrine that Clark Kerr	
19	came up with in 1984 to address the wage premium	
20	that had developed over time.	
21	Q Right. His proposal was to slowly	
22	reduce to slowly reduce	

		1738
1	A The growth.	
2	Q wages	
3	A The growth.	
4	Q of the	
5	A The growth. Not to reduce wages, but	
6	to reduce the growth rate rate of future wages	
7	to bring those the employees back in line with	
8	their counterparts in the private sector.	
9	Q Right. So	
10	A It was never it was never intended	
11	to reduce wages.	
12	Q It was to reduce the growth of	
13	wages over time	
14	A But those aren't the same thing.	
15	Q but over time with the that	
16	the whatever alleged wage premium there was	
17	would disappear, correct?	
18	A That's that was the concept, yes.	
19	Q So private sector wages would grow at a	
20	more rapid rate than would postal wages using the	
21	ECI minus one model?	
22	A That's correct. And though we got ECI	

1739 minus one explicitly in the agreement with the 1 FOP, the other arbitrators at that same point in time were awarding contracts that were less than ECI minus one, explicitly so. Arbitrator Stark found that -- or that -- that wage growth even more modest than 6 that that was found in the Mittenthal award should be awarded. So you saw in the -- in my 9 exhibit yesterday over that '94 contract that the 10 wage growth of the PPOs of ECI minus one far 11 exceeded that of the APWU, and the APWU was the 12 same package as the NALC. 13 I'm not going to argue with you about 14 the -- we don't have the resources to -- to -- to 15 question you on -- on all those awards. But I'm -- my point is -- my question 16 17 to you is: The ECI minus one was a proposal to 18 slowly reduce the growth of PPO wages over time; 19 is that right? 20 To bring them back in line with private 21 sector counterparts, right. 22 And what did the PPO get -- if it was a Q

```
1740
    matter of bargaining priorities, what did the
 1
 2
     PPOs get in exchange for that?
               I -- I don't know if there's an answer
     to that question.
               You mentioned the Rural Letter
     Carriers, for example, at one point, gave up some
 6
     growth in wages in exchange for job protection,
     right?
 8
 9
               I mean, you can -- you can look at that
10
    package and say that, but -- but, you know, the
11
     -- the fact that the FOP agreed to it, not only
     in 1994, but in 1996, 1999 and 2003, suggests
12
13
     that the -- that -- and ratified that in each of
14
     those years suggests that there was something of
15
     value in that agreement for the -- for the union.
               I -- I -- you know, to ask me to point
16
17
     out specifically was there a -- a quid quo for
18
     the ECI minus one, that we gave them something
19
     explicitly, I don't know, but -- but I think the
20
     fact that it was negotiated and ratified on four
21
     separate occasions suggests that there was
22
     something of value in it to the membership.
```

		1741
1	Q Well, there was a cost to going to	
2	arbitration, is there not, at least for at	
3	least on for the PPOs' union; is that correct?	
4	A There is a cost to arbitration, yes.	
5	Q Right. A financial cost?	
6	A Financial cost, yes.	
7	Q And under let me ask let me ask	
8	it this way. One second. Just one second, Joe.	
9	Let me move on for a moment to oh,	
10	yeah. Joe, if I could direct you to on the	
11	the union binder, and it should be in there.	
12	It's Union Exhibit No. 77. There wasn't one of	
13	the original exhibits. It was one of the ones	
14	Professor Belman testified to.	
15	A I don't have a copy of that.	
16	MS. GONSALVES: We should have another	
17	copy.	
18	THE WITNESS: Okay.	
19	MS. GONSALVES: I'm not ready yet. I'm	
20	sorry.	
21	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: I'm having trouble	
22	finding it.	

	1742
1	ARBITRATOR BJORK: I have it here.
2	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: You got it?
3	ARBITRATOR BJORK: Yeah.
4	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: All right. Thanks.
5	BY MR. STEPHENS
6	Q Okay. My first question about this
7	document, Union Exhibit 77, is looking at
8	these salary numbers for PPO and Carrier 1, top
9	step, are those numbers correct, to your
10	knowledge?
11	A I didn't verify them. I haven't I
12	don't know.
13	Q Is it correct to say that the pay of
14	PPOs has fallen relative to letter city letter
15	carriers in the years since 2008?
16	A Since the years since
17	Q 2008.
18	A I has has city carrier wage
19	growth been faster than that of PPOA since 2008?
20	I would say yes. And the reason for that,
21	largely, is the result of the contracts that were
22	negotiated in 2006 with our bargaining units,

1743 including the city letter carriers. 1 2 And those contracts were signed before the 2008 Fishgold award; is that right? Α They were, yes. Now, just to -- to expand on that, in the 2006 round of bargaining, the Postal Service again had a goal of reducing unit labor costs and to -- to go after total labor costs, what we were calling total labor 9 costs at the time. And so we had a target for 10 wage growth overall at ECI minus one or labor 11 costs overall of ECI minus one are less with all 12 the four bargaining units. 13 We achieved that without regard to a set wage pattern, and in terms of the -- for 14 15 example, in the -- in the city letter carrier craft, they got higher wage increases than the 16 other three bargaining units because they also 17 18 negotiated a large increase in the number of 19 non-career employees that the Postal Service 20 could use. And when you took the sum total of 21 the value of that contract, the higher wage 22 increases that were offset by the large increase

		1744
1	in the non-career workforce produced a total	
2	labor cost increase of less than ECI minus one	
3	percent, more than ECI minus one percent. It	
4	turned out to be about ECI minus 2 percent.	
5	So the wage increases were the extra	
6	wage increases that the NALC negotiated in that	
7	round of bargaining were paid for, so to speak,	
8	by a large increase in the number of non-career	
9	workers.	
10	Q Let's go to Slide 51 for a moment.	
11	Let's talk about the non-career workforce.	
12	The APWU, for example, has a has a	
13	relatively strict the post office does not	
14	have as much let me phrase it this way: The	
15	post office does not have the same right to	
16	subcontract work, APWU work, as it does for	
17	police officers; is that correct?	
18	A The subcontracting language for all of	
19	the bargaining units differs in circumstance, so	
20		
21	Q But	
22	A No, they're not identical.	

		1745
1	Q it's quite broad for the Postal	
2	Police; is that right?	
3	A It is quite broad for the Postal Police	
4	relative to the other bargaining units.	
5	Q Okay. And, in fact, the post office	
6	had already contracted out quite lot of the	
7	Postal Police Officer work beginning in the late	
8	'90s; is that right?	
9	A Beginning in the late '90s, yes.	
10	Q So a lot of the for example, the	
11	fixed post work, about which there's been such	
12	testimony, used to be done by Postal Police	
13	Officers, and now it's largely done by unarmed	
14	ABM security guards, correct?	
15	A Right. And as we've shown, that change	
16	took place between 2003 and 2007, largely took	
17	place between that period of time.	
18	Q Okay. I don't think that's quite	
19	accurate, but in any event, it's that's not an	
20	important point.	
21	So, in essence, the post office has	
22	already obtained the second tier workforce and	

		1746
1	did so without by without having to	
2	undercut the PPO pay?	
3	A Well, I and I think that's the	
4	rationale for our our proposals in this round	
5	of bargaining. We we greatly increased the	
6	non-career workforce in each of the other four	
7	bargaining units. We're asking for nothing in	
8	terms of non-career workforce with the PPOA in	
9	in recognition of the fact that we've largely	
10	done that with the ABM workforce.	
11	Q And, Joe, if I can refer you to Slide	
12	55 for a moment. I guess I want to go back to	
13	the idea of internal comparability.	
14	Is it correct to say that Arbitrator	
15	Fishgold effectively adopted the principles of	
16	internal comparability in rendering his award for	
17	the Mail Handlers in this last round of	
18	negotiations?	
19	A No, I wouldn't say that. You know, he	
20	referred to the to the other awards in in	
21	setting his award, but it did differ in many	
22	significant respects from the other awards. And	

1747 that's not unusual, I mean, for arbitrators or 1 negotiations within a round of bargaining to look very similar, and the reason for that is -- is simple. The Postal Service develops a bargaining strategy for the upcoming round of negotiations, very general terms, we need to increase the size of the non-career workforce, we need to reduce unit labor costs, overall growth of labor costs 9 of less than ECI minus one, and -- and then 10 bargains with each of the seven unions in -- in 11 that context. 12 We don't approach negotiations with a 13 blank slate with each -- with each bargaining 14 unit. And so I think you see across bargaining 15 cycles that awards in the various contracts are similar, but not identical. You know, you see 16 that in '84. You see that in '94. You saw that 17 18 in 2006. You certainly see it so far in 2010. 19 So that is not unusual in the least. And it's 20 not internal comparability in terms of strict 21 internal comparability where mail handlers have 22 to be paid the same as APWU Grade 5.

		1748
1	Q I'd take you to just a couple	
2	questions regarding Arbitrator Fishgold's	
3	decision. First of all, Slide 62. You know, I	
4	think you've mentioned it before, but it's	
5	correct that the 39 U.S.C. 1003(c) argument was	
6	not made in this case; is that right?	
7	MS. GONSALVES: Third time.	
8	BY MR. STEPHENS	
9	Q Okay.	
10	A To the best of my knowledge, no.	
11	Q And on Slide 63, is it correct that	
12	Arbitrator Fishgold made his made his	
13	conclusion regarding the made his conclusion	
14	based on the economic presentation given in that	
15	case? Is that correct?	
16	A He did not indicate in his award what	
17	he based or what arguments he found persuasive.	
18	I don't know.	
19	Q What did talking about	
20	comparability, what comparison did Arbitrator	
21	Fishgold use in making his award in 2008?	
22	A What what	

		1749
1	Q What was the unit to whom he compared	
2	Postal Police	
3	A Well, he he he actually	
4	sidestepped the issue, and he did indicate in his	
5	award that comparability was unnecessary or or	
6	a look at internal comparability in this case was	
7	unnecessary.	
8	Q Well, I'm talking about comparable	
9	to what group did he compare the Postal Police in	
10	rendering his decision?	
11	A He did not explicitly say what group he	
12	was comparing them to. He did indicate that	
13	their their duties reflected security work	
14	and and some duties that looked like police	
15	officers, as other panels have found in the past.	
16	But he did not come down on one side or the other	
17	on that issue.	
18	Q Bear with me one second, Joe. If I can	
19	take you to Slide No. 67.	
20	MR. STEPHENS: It would be 105?	
21	ARBITRATOR BJORK: 105.	
22	MS. MCKINNON: 105.	

```
1750
 1
               MR. STEPHENS: I'm going to apologize.
 2
     This was an exhibit I created, so blame me for
     the no three-hole punch. That's not anyone else
              I apologize in advance for that.
               MS. GONSALVES: Chris, we have a
     three-hole punch if you want it.
 6
     BY MR. STEPHENS
          Q
              Now, is it correct that until
 9
     December 27th of 2013, the post office's economic
10
    proposal was a 5 percent wage cut?
11
               The lay-down proposal we had in
          Α
     negotiations was for a 5 percent wage cut.
12
13
               Is it correct that that -- that that
     didn't change until December 27th, when it was
14
     changed in the prehearing brief? Is that
15
16
     correct?
               I -- I do not know. I mean, there was
17
    no lay-down proposal other than the 5 percent
18
19
    wage cut.
20
               When impasse was declared, it was based
21
     on a 5 percent wage cut, correct?
22
               The -- the table that was on -- the
          A
```

	1751
1	proposal that was on the table at the time was
2	for a 5 percent wage cut, yes.
3	Q Okay. Now, I've handed you do you
4	recognize this document?
5	A I do.
6	Q And what is this document?
7	A It is Appendix C to the prehearing
8	brief to the Postal Service.
9	Q And can I direct your attention, I
10	guess, to pages 1 and 2? And is it correct that
11	in this revised proposal we got in December of
12	2013, the post office proposed a wage freeze in
13	year one and year two, a 1 percent increase in
14	year three, a 1.5 percent in year four and a
15	1 percent in year five, plus COLAs? Is that
16	correct?
17	A I can you repeat the question,
18	please, because I
19	Q I'm asking: What was the post office's
20	economic proposal in December 2013?
21	A To who? To the Postal Police?
22	Q Well, it's to the panel at that point,

		1752
1	because bargaining was over. So	
2	A Right. If the	
3	Q what was the proposal	
4	A For this	
5	Q For this case.	
6	A was was a two-year wage	
7	freeze followed by moderate wage increases that	
8	approximate that approximate the pattern	
9	established in in the other unions.	
10	Q Well, let's be specific, I mean, if we	
11	could. At the bottom of page 1	
12	A Right. And that's a description of	
13	what the other unions received.	
14	Q Right. And so	
15	A Then, if you turn to page 3 under	
16	wages, it's a little more explicit there. The	
17	Postal Service proposes a wage moratorium for the	
18	first two of the contract, followed by three	
19	years of that approximate the wage pattern	
20	established by the other bargaining unions in	
21	this round of collective bargaining.	
22	So at no point was the Postal Service	

		1753
1	proposing identical wage packages for the other	1733
2	bargaining units. The pattern we're talking	
3	about here is the two-year wage freeze followed	
4	by modest general wage increases.	
5	Q So	
6	A The word "approximate" was there for a	
7	reason, approximate.	
8	Q Okay. So your testimony is, then, that	
9	the the postal post office does not	
10	actually make its economic proposal until your	
11	testimony yesterday?	
12	A It was more explicit in my testimony	
13	yesterday than it had been up to that point, yes.	
14	Q Has that ever been done in any other	
15	interest arbitration the post office has been	
16	involved in, where the economic proposal is not	
17	made until the last day of the interest	
18	arbitration hearing?	
19	MS. GONSALVES: I think we need to go	
20	off the record for a minute here and have a	
21	discussion between Arlus and me and the panel,	
22	because I just think that there's some great	

```
1754
    misrepresentations being made here, and I -- I --
 1
 2
     I think it just needs to be cleared up once and
 3
     for all.
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Fine. We can do
     that.
               (Brief recess.)
               ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: All right. Arlus,
 8
    carry on.
 9
               MR. STEPHENS: Okay.
10
    BY MR. STEPHENS
11
               Joe, on Slide 67, is it correct to say,
          0
    then, that the -- management's proposal regarding
12
13
    wages is based on a internal comparability rather
    than comparing to any particular group in the
14
    private sector?
15
16
          Α
            No.
            It's not correct?
17
18
         Α
              No.
19
              But the numbers are meant to simulate
20
    the numbers from the last round of negotiations
21
    with the other postal unions?
22
          A No. The overall pattern of the
```

1755 two-year wage freeze followed by three modest 1 2 general wage increases does comport with the pattern with the other bargaining units, but ECI 3 minus one is -- we've included ECI minus one in our proposal based on our finding of -- of a wage premium that exists between Postal Police 6 Officers and their private sector counterparts, that ECI minus one going forward is still 9 justified. 10 Let's go to Slide 68. Is it correct to say that the reduction in employer contributions 11 matches that from the other bargaining units? 12 13 In 2015 and 2016, it does, yes, but it does not currently, nor -- nor will it in 2014. 14 15 But it's not based on a comparison to police officer benefits in the private sector? 16 It's compared to the private sector 17 18 average contribution, employer contribution 19 towards employee health benefits of 76 percent. 20 That's private sector comparability. 21 One thing to note about health benefits is that they're not specific to -- to 22

```
1756
     occupations. A health benefit plan for you costs
 1
 2
     the same roughly as someone in the same
     demographic regardless of occupation, whether
     they're a custodian or, you know, a Wall Street
     trader. The health benefit premium costs are
     about the same, so -- so it isn't dependent on --
     on occupation.
              But it's correct that the employers
 9
     share the premium very significantly, is that
10
     correct, across --
11
          A Very significantly --
12
              -- between occupations?
              -- I -- I haven't seen any evidence of
13
14
    that.
15
            So it's correct that some occupations
    have a greater degree of health care paid for by
16
     their employer than other occupations; is that
17
18
     correct?
19
          Α
              Based on what? I've never seen -- I
20
    have not seen that, no. I've not seen any
    evidence that would corroborate that.
21
22
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Well, it would
```

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1757
     certainly be true that that's -- that variability
 1
 2
     exists among employers.
 3
               THE WITNESS: Employers is probably
     the -- the biggest variation is among employers,
 5
    but not occupations.
 6
               ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Yes.
 7
               THE WITNESS: So an employer has a
 8
    health benefits plan that they apply to all of
 9
     their employees regardless of occupation.
10
    don't think there's a uniform police officer
11
    employer contribution that makes any sense for
12
    this --
13
    BY MR. STEPHENS
14
               Joe, on Slide 68, they're reducing the
     starting salary by 7.7 percent; is that right?
15
16
               That's correct.
               Won't that actually reduce the starting
17
     PPO pay below that of many ABM security guards
18
19
     working for the post office?
20
               I -- I've not made that comparison.
21
    don't know.
22
               MR. STEPHENS: Perhaps we'll just
```

		1758
1	introduce that ourselves in a paper exhibit	
2	afterwards. I have no further questions.	
3	MS. GONSALVES: No redirect.	
4	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Joe, you've	
5	escaped.	
6	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Can I can I just	
7	follow up, Joe?	
8	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Whoops. Not quite.	
9	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: I just want to go	
10	back to Slide 15 and the whole issue of	
11	contracting out.	
12	THE WITNESS: Slide what? Excuse me.	
13	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: It's 15. And I just	
14	thought it might be helpful to the panel and,	
15	frankly, to the parties in the room to for you	
16	to kind of walk through for us as you said,	
17	there were a multiplicity of factors that would	
18	enter into a contracting out decision, not just	
19	the wage rate, and I wanted to walk through some	
20	of those factors and see whether you would agree	
21	as an executive at the Postal Service. First and	
22	foremost are the legacy cost issues, retiree	

		1759
1	health care.	
2	Would that be something that the Postal	
3	Service would completely avoid through the	
4	contracting out process?	
5	THE WITNESS: It would, yes.	
6	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: And the investment	
7	risk associated with the pension plan, would that	
8	be something that	
9	THE WITNESS: Yes. The employer right	
10	now, under both of our health retirement	
11	retirement plans assumes considerable amount of	
12	investment risk.	
13	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Could you explain	
14	for the parties just give them an insight into	
15	how changes in the discount rate, for example,	
16	for either FERS for or the CSR, changes in which	
17	the Postal Service has no control over, impact	
18	the Postal Service's legacy costs?	
19	THE WITNESS: Well, it has a tremendous	
20	impact on a lot of our legacy costs, not only in	
21	our pension area, but also on retiree health	
22	benefits, workman's comp, anything that we have a	

1760 long-term liability for, the discount rate, which 1 are currently very, very low, and, thus, the rate of return that we can expect based on the low market rates now dramatically impacts what our liability is going forward. ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Could you describe 7 for the parties the flexibility that the Postal Service would have in determining, for example, 9 in a place like San Francisco, how they would 10 contract out the work between, let's say, 11 security guard and -- and a police officer 12 function, particularly given the fact that 13 60 percent of the hours are going to be worked at night? 14 15 THE WITNESS: Well, there certainly would be a cost comparison made, not only of --16 between Postal Police Officers versus contract 17 18 security -- and whether that's contract Guard II 19 or Police I or some combination of the two, that 20 would be part of it. But -- but there are other 21 security alternatives. You know, there's technology. There's -- there's -- there are any 22

1761 number of, you know, access control, you know, 1 2 options available there, and that would be considered. And I'm not an expert at this, but -- but from speaking with the Inspection Service, technology is -- is an alternative. is a substitute in some cases for the activities 7 performed by Postal Police Officers. So that 8 would be part of the mix. 9 But you would do a lifetime cost or --10 or a fully-loaded cost. You would include the 11 legacy costs as well as the wages and benefits. 12 I think it's worth pointing out on this slide 13 that no matter how you cut it, the -- the wages -- when you include the wages -- and these 14 don't include the retiree health benefits -- that 15 the fully-loaded cost salaries plus benefits 16 exceed even that of Police Officer I by -- by a 17 18 significant amount. 19 ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Could I take you to 20 the Vaughn award, which is, I think, Exhibit 12? 21 Volume 3, Postal Service exhibit book. Could I take you specifically to page 13 of that award? 22

1762 And give the panel some opportunity here. 1 2 And could I ask you to look at the 3 bottom of page 13, the paragraph beginning "whether," and could I have you just read into the record that -- from that -- beginning with whether to the end of the paragraph on page 14? THE WITNESS: Sure. Arbitrator Vaughn 8 wrote that whether, in hindsight, the value of 9 the Union's gains in the 1990s negotiations --10 1990 negotiations were worth the cost is not the 11 test of whether or not the agreement was valid or indeed whether the trade-offs are now used up and 12 13 should now be reversed. Choices between wages and benefits in long-term versus short-term gains 14 are the right and responsibility of each party in 15 collective bargaining. Interest arbitrators must 16 be reluctant to undo an earlier negotiated 17 18 agreement on the basis that one party, in 19 hindsight, thinks the other got the better of 20 the -- of the deal. Put another way, a deal is a 21 deal. The Rural Letter Carriers, for example, struck a voluntary agreement with the Postal 22

1763 1 Service in 1978 which included a cap on COLA. 2 That agreement has cost those employees approximately \$2,000 each year since, yet the 3 Rural Letter Carriers have not been able to correct the results of that bargaining through subsequent arbitration, including the 1985 Volz In light of the manner in which the award. internal wage differences at issue in this 9 proceeding have been created, the appropriate way 10 to correct previously bargained for results is 11 through mutual agreement and not through the 12 interest -- the arbitration process. I decline, 13 therefore, to make the Union's requested equity 14 adjustments to restore wage parity with the APWU 15 bargaining unit. 16 ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Does that paragraph, 17 in essence, capture the point that you were 18 trying to make with your slide? 19 THE WITNESS: It does. And I quoted a 20 small part of that and -- and probably not 21 enough. Yes, that is, in essence, the point that 22 was being made.

	1764
1	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: That's all I have.
2	ARBITRATOR BJORK: I just have one.
3	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Yes.
4	ARBITRATOR BJORK: Actually, I have 20
5	questions.
6	THE WITNESS: Yes.
7	ARBITRATOR BJORK: No, just one.
8	Earlier, when you were talking about the
9	carriers and I didn't hold it, but I think
10	you said they received regarding priorities,
11	they received a bonus at the top, and for that,
12	they gave up the tier at the bottom.
13	THE WITNESS: In this contract?
14	ARBITRATOR BJORK: Yes.
15	THE WITNESS: When I was discussing
16	this contract? No, I don't think that's quite
17	right. In in the APWU agreement that preceded
18	it, we negotiated the parties negotiated a
19	lower entry step and a lower top step. So future
20	career employees not only start out at a lower
21	salary, but also max out at a lower salary than
22	current career employees. That particular part

1765 was unacceptable to the NALC. We could not reach 1 agreement and -- and they would not agree to future career employees being paid less at the top step than current career employees. So in the -- in the -- in this -- in the arbitration award, that top step remained the 6 It wasn't a bonus. It remained the same same. in the new top salary schedule as -- as the 9 current employees make, but in -- in -- in 10 exchange for that, if you will, they reduced the 11 entry step. 13 percent for the APWU is over 20 percent for the NALC. So their entry 12 13 employees -- their employees starting out as city letter carriers will make far less than they 14 15 currently do. In addition to that, those new career employees had their -- their COLA formula 16 17 modified. 18 Now, the Postal Service has tried to 19 eliminate COLA for its bargaining units forever. 20 It's an important bargaining goal. It's one of 21 those things that it can probably only be accomplished through negotiated agreement, 22

1766 because interest arbitrators -- arbitrators are 1 loathe to make that kind of big change. So -and we've been unable to -- to negotiate away COLA for those bargaining units, although it's been a very important priority for the Postal But in this contract for the very first time, we were able to make a significant modification for the COLA formula for new career 9 employees that will pay them up to 35 percent 10 less in COLA payments than current career 11 employees make. 12 ARBITRATOR BJORK: And I guess the 13 point I'm trying to make is that there's a 14 certain pile of money, so to speak, that's going 15 to be distributed among the bargaining unit. other units were in a better position to allocate 16 that money than we ever would be based on the 18 fact that we're not hiring people at the 19 beginning step, by in large. 20 THE WITNESS: I think you could say the 21 same thing for APWU. I don't -- I don't remember 22 the last time the Postal Service hired an APWU

1767 clerk. We went years without hiring a single 1 APWU clerk. We just don't hire them. We don't hire mail handlers anymore, career mail handlers, and -- and for obvious reasons. The first negotiations I was involved with in 1998 with the APWU, they had over 350,000 career employees. Today, they have fewer than 160,000. So their ranks have diminished greatly. So it's the same 9 situation in the APWU. I don't think it's unique to the Postal Police Officers. But the other 10 11 bargaining units were not hiring anybody. 12 ARBITRATOR BJORK: But those PSEs would 13 become career at some point when the need 14 existed? 15 THE WITNESS: At some point in time, the current career workforce for the APWU will 16 17 retire to the point where the Postal Service will 18 have to replace them. 19 ARBITRATOR BJORK: And based on the 20 discussions about the age of the PPO workforce 21 and the nearing retirement by -- by a large 22 percentage, would it not make sense to be able to

		1768
1	hire at that beginning step in terms of the cost	
2	savings, which would free up that pile of money	
3	throughout the the occupation?	
4	THE WITNESS: You know, I'm not really	
5	sure how to answer that question. Yes, if we had	
6	a lower starting salary for PPOs and and we	
7	changed our current policy of recruiting PPOs	
8	from within the organization and started hiring	
9	PPOs at a at a lower starting salary than we	
10	currently do, then, theoretically, there would be	
11	some cost savings associated with that.	
12	It's it's virtually impossible to	
13	you know, and that's that's very speculative.	
14	We don't currently hire from the outside. It's	
15	not known how we're going to be replacing PPOs	
16	over time and where they'll be coming from, so	
17	ARBITRATOR BJORK: Okay. Thank you.	
18	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Joe, I just have	
19	one one final follow-up, because I think it's	
20	important for the panel and for the parties to	
21	understand this history, too.	
22	We've had some reference to the	

		1769
1	Goldberg award, and in particular, I think the	
2	sentence in which Arbitrator Goldberg wrote that	
3	if the current legislative system for financing	
4	the Postal Service is no longer functioning well	
5	due to technological changes and the means by	
6	which Americans communicate, it is for Congress	
7	to provide an alternative financing system, not	
8	for this panel to require Postal Service	
9	employees to subsidize the long-term structural	
10	deficit of the Postal Service by working at wages	
11	and benefits less than those earned by employees	
12	doing comparable work in the private sector.	
13	Are you aware that in the aftermath of	
14	this award, the President of the United States at	
15	the time, George W. Bush, commissioned the Postal	
16	Reform Committee?	
17	THE WITNESS: He did, yes.	
18	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: And was there	
19	hearings and testimony before that committee in	
20	2003?	
21	THE WITNESS: There were. The	
22	President's commission met, and there was a	

		1770
1	report published in 2003.	
2	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: And part of this	
3	issue was discussed in the context of that	
4	report?	
5	THE WITNESS: Yes. And that that	
6	was	
7	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: And that report then	
8	went to Congress and that led in part to the	
9	Postal Accountability Enhancement Act, in which	
10	Congress specifically address addressed this	
11	issue. And I would like your perspective on how	
12	Congress addressed this issue.	
13	THE WITNESS: Well, the Postal Service	
14	was part of the argument back then that the	
15	Postal Service had was that its current	
16	ratemaking structure was unresponsive to market	
17	needs. It took too long. You filed a rate case.	
18	It took you nine, ten months to get a decision,	
19	and it needed more flexibility in that regard.	
20	So there were a lot of components. And that's	
21	one of the main ones that they addressed, and	
22	they did that through the implement imposition	

1771 of a price gap. 1 2 And as I testified to yesterday, I 3 don't know if it was unintended consequences or just a failure to -- to follow this through to its logical conclusion, but that -- that price cap has caused considerable problems for the Postal Service, particularly in an -- in an era where volume declined precipitously, especially 9 for first-class mail. Our labor cost could not 10 adjust as rapidly as our volume and revenue were 11 disappearing, and price gap prevented us from --12 from getting the revenue needed to cover that --13 that cost base. 14 The Postal Service has worked furiously 15 to -- to reduce its labor costs and to change its labor cost structure and to reduce its workforce, 16 but we're always behind the curve. And because 18 of the price cap, we -- we've -- as has been 19 noted by many, we've lost billions and billions 20 of dollars since the implementation of the PAEA. 21 ARBITRATOR DUFEK: At any time during 22 the legislative deliberations leading up to the

		4.7.7.0
1	PAEA, or indeed, over the last three years in the	1772
2	legislative deliberations leading up to the	
3	proposal, which just recently, I understand from	
4	Jim, got through committee, has there been any	
5	suggestion from any member of Congress that the	
6	Postal Service will receive tax subsidies or	
7	appropriations?	
8	THE WITNESS: No, not that I'm aware	
9	of, and and I don't think the Postal Service	
10	would support that.	
11	ARBITRATOR DUFEK: So the message from	
12	Congress is get our costs in line with the	
13	revenue?	
14	THE WITNESS: That that was	
15	explicitly the message that Congress sent with	
16	the passage of the PAEA, that this now they're	
17	giving the Postal Service the flexibility that	
18	they've asked for and it's up to them to to	
19	bring their costs in line with with their	
20	product market.	
21	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Anything else, Jim?	
22	ARBITRATOR BJORK: No.	

		1773
1	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: All right. Thank	
2	you very much, Joe.	
3	(Witness excused.)	
4	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Teresa, I believe	
5	you have a short witness?	
6	MS. GONSALVES: Yes. Our final witness	
7	is just a short witness to address the panel's	
8	questions regarding the methodology of the	
9	putting together of the 5305 chart that we saw.	
10	I don't know the exhibit number, but I think Kate	
11	will know.	
12	MS. SULLIVAN: It's D-8.	
13	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: D-8.	
14	MS. GONSALVES: And just about how that	
15	was put together. He the person testifying is	
16	Michael Billingsley, and he was responsible for	
17	assembling the information.	
18	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Is this Volume 2?	
19	MS. GONSALVES: What volume is this?	
20	MS. SULLIVAN: It's Volume 1, I	
21	believe, D-8, or actually	
22	MS. GONSALVES: No, it's Volume 2.	

```
1774
 1
               MS. SULLIVAN: It's Volume 2. My
 2
    apologies. D-8.
 3
              MS. GONSALVES: Michael, do you have it
    up there?
               MR. BILLINGSLEY: I don't see it.
 6
               ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Here, you can have
    mine. I've seen it.
               MS. GONSALVES: Do you have the one
 9
    that's written on?
10
               ARBITRATOR DUFEK: There's no writing
11
    on mine.
12
              MS. SULLIVAN: And just to be clear,
13
    Michael's testifying about how he put this data
14
    together. He's not testifying as to the
     substance behind it. That was Keith Milke.
15
16
               ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Fine.
    Mr. Billingsley, you're still under oath. I
17
    trust you will understand that.
18
19
               THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
20
21
22
```

		1775
1	WHEREUPON,	
2	MICHAEL BILLINGSLEY	
3	was called for continued examination, and having	
4	been previously duly sworn was examined and	
5	testified further as follows:	
6	DIRECT EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE	
7	POSTAL SERVICE	
8	BY MS. SULLIVAN	
9	Q Michael, did you prepare this chart for	
10	interest arbitration?	
11	A I did.	
12	Q Can you just walk through the panel	
13	through how you prepared the chart?	
14	A Sure. I started with asking members of	
15	our management contract administration group, who	
16	work with the PPOA, to solicit 5305 forms for the	
17	month of August. When those forms were mailed to	
18	that group, they were given to me. I enlisted	
19	the help of some data entry personnel, who	
20	inputted the data from those forms into an Excel	
21	sheet, for which I compiled the numbers, the	
22	summary numbers that you see here for 2013.	

		1776
1	Q And is this chart a true and accurate	
2	reflection of the 5305 data that was provided to	
3	you by the Inspection Service?	
4	A It is.	
5	MS. SULLIVAN: Those are all the	
6	questions I have.	
7	MR. STEPHENS: Okay. I I have	
8	cross.	
9	CROSS-EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE	
10	UNION	
11	BY MR. STEPHENS	
12	Q You have numbers for 2013. What	
13	what about the numbers for all the other years?	
14	A They were supplied previously using the	
15	same methodology that I used to compile the 2013	
16	numbers. Unfortunately, the personnel who	
17	completed those studies are no longer with this	
18	group.	
19	Q They were previously supplied in what	
20	context?	
21	A In summary fashion. I have sheets that	
22	essentially look the same as the data that I put	

	1777
1	together for 2013 for the different work hour
2	classifications here.
3	Q But you never you never saw those
4	sheets; is that correct?
5	A I never saw those sheets, the physical
6	forms.
7	Q And the 5305 sheets are shredded after
8	six months; is that correct?
9	A I am not aware of that. I'm but I
10	have no reason to
11	Q They're actually directing you to
12	where it says it in the IS-701
13	A I trust that that's true.
14	Q Now, in the 2008 case, the post office
15	didn't use the any 5305 analysis; isn't that
16	correct?
17	A I was not here. I don't recall.
18	Q Let me ask you some questions about the
19	form. In the binder, it should be the next tab,
20	Tab 9.
21	A Okay.
22	Q And did you receive what exactly did

		1778
1	you go through? Did you receive copies of this	
2	form filled out?	
3	A Yes.	
4	Q Okay. And from whom did you receive	
5	them? From which divisions?	
6	A All of the divisions that employed	
7	PPOs.	
8	Q Okay. And so you received now,	
9	there will be these are created for every	
10	tour; is that right?	
11	A That's correct.	
12	Q So for every day, every tour	
13	A Every day, every tour	
14	Q every	
15	A signed off by a PPO supervisor	
16	nationwide for every division that employed a	
17	PPO.	
18	Q Okay. And this was done in okay.	
19	Now, August is when the PPOs are	
20	typically on vacation; is that correct?	
21	A I did not do that analysis.	
22	Q And if PPOs are on vacation, they're	

		1779
1	often pulled from mobile patrols because of	
2	reduced manpower; is that correct?	
3	A I have no knowledge of that.	
4	Q And these are completed at the end	
5	of at the end of the shift before the	
6	supervisor's able to leave for the day; is that	
7	correct?	
8	A My understanding is that a supervisor	
9	signs off on this form. I don't know the timing	
10	of when that happens. I assume it's after the	
11	shift occurs.	
12	Q And are you aware that these forms are	
13	actually filled out differently in different	
14	divisions?	
15	A I do not have any direct knowledge of	
16	that. It wouldn't surprise me if if one	
17	person human differences. I have no reason to	
18	believe that they're substantively different	
19	across divisions.	
20	Q Are you aware, in some divisions, ABM	
21	guards are included in the numbers?	
22	A I am not.	

		1780
1	Q Are you aware that that's how it's done	
2	here, for example, here in the headquarters	
3	building?	
4	A I am not.	
5	MS. SULLIVAN: I'm going to object.	
6	Mike Michael doesn't have any knowledge beyond	
7	the the data I mean, he can testify to	
8	that, but he doesn't have knowledge beyond the	
9	5305 data that he was provided as far as the	
10	procedures of the Inspection Service, and that's	
11	not part of his	
12	THE WITNESS: And maybe it would help	
13	if I if I described to you exactly what	
14	happened. You see these these boxes here for	
15	fixed post, mobile posts, foot patrol, convoy	
16	duty, administrative and other. In a filled-out	
17	form, there's hours in these boxes. All I asked	
18	the data entry personnel to do was take the	
19	numbers, input them into electronic form so I	
20	could compile the dita. I have no knowledge	
21	beyond what the numbers are that are listed here,	
22	signed off on by a PPO supervisor.	
l		

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1781
 1
               MR. STEPHENS: Okay. So my
 2
     understanding was that a witness was going to be
    prepared in order to explain the chart and be
     able to answer questions about the meaning of the
     numbers, not just --
               MS. SULLIVAN: I believe --
               MR. STEPHENS: -- mechanical.
 8
               MS. SULLIVAN: -- that's what Keith
 9
    Milke's testimony was.
               MR. STEPHENS: He testified he couldn't
10
11
     testify -- he didn't know anything about the
12
     chart.
13
               MS. SULLIVAN: He couldn't testify as
14
    to how the chart was compiled, but he could
15
     testify about what PPO duties are and what fixed
    post means, what mobile posts means, foot
16
    patrols, convoy duty, and I believe he testified
17
18
     to that.
19
               MR. STEPHENS: Well, I didn't get a
20
     chance to question -- cross-examine him fully
21
    about this, because he pretty quickly
     acknowledged he knew nothing about it. Isn't
22
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		1782
1	that your recollection?	
2	MS. SULLIVAN: I believe his testimony	
3	was that he didn't know how the chart was	
4	compiled, so we put on Michael to explain how he	
5	developed the chart.	
6	MR. STEPHENS: But we have a need to	
7	ask about the questions and about the 5305 form	
8	which was used. I mean, I think is it fair to	
9	say that the in order to understand the chart,	
10	one must first understand what the Form 5305	
11	gathers?	
12	MS. SULLIVAN: Yes. If I remember	
13	correctly, I believe Keith Milke testified what	
14	the 5305 form was and who fills it out and what	
15	it's used for.	
16	MR. STEPHENS: But if it includes ABM	
17	security guards in the number, that doesn't	
18	actually reflect anything about what PPOs are	
19	doing, does it?	
20	MS. SULLIVAN: You had the opportunity	
21	to ask that question of Keith Milke, and it	
22	wasn't asked.	
i		

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1783
 1
               MR. STEPHENS: Actually, I didn't have
 2
     that opportunity because he said he didn't know
 3
     anything about it. I mean, the problem is, this
     chart is meaningless, and I'd like to -- if
     it's -- if the panel wants -- finds the chart to
    be of any relevance, I'd like the opportunity to
 7
     actually cross-examine a witness who can -- to
     say something about the 5305 form.
               THE WITNESS: I just had one question
 9
10
     just so --
11
               MR. STEPHENS: Yeah.
12
               THE WITNESS: -- I'm clear. Is -- are
     you saying that in 2013, it's not relevant as
13
     compared to 2007, as compared to whenever --
14
               MR. STEPHENS: I don't know anything
15
     about any of these numbers. I've never seen any
16
     of these numbers before.
17
               THE WITNESS: So the whole chart is
18
19
     irrelevant? I'm just trying to understand.
20
               MR. STEPHENS: I'll just --
21
               THE WITNESS: The methodology --
              MR. STEPHENS: I'll save my own
22
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1784 personal testimony -- I don't -- in order to 1 understand what the chart represents, I have to understand what the data means, and if it's including ABM security guards on fixed posts, I don't see how -- what relevance it has to this proceeding. That's my own personal opinion. MS. GONSALVES: All right. Well, it 8 was our understanding that the questions were 9 addressing: Did you put this chart together? 10 No, I didn't. That sort of thing. You don't 11 know how the chart was put together? No. Did you review the forms? No, I didn't. 12 13 And we offered -- we volunteered to 14 bring the person to -- to testify. It was 15 Michael Billingsley who put together the chart and was responsible for that. 16 17 ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Yes. And let me 18 say a few -- a few things. The point is: 19 are we to make of this chart? It's now in 20 evidence. And something has come out right now 21 that didn't come out before, that is, a suggestion that fixed post security guards are 22

		1785
1	included in the numbers here. If that's so, that	
2	infects the value of this chart.	
3	MS. GONSALVES: So the the Postal	
4	Service is willing to bring on another witness	
5	if if the panel would like to address that	
6	question specifically.	
7	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: These are always	
8	cost benefit	
9	MS. GONSALVES: Yeah.	
10	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: assessments.	
11	MS. GONSALVES: I just don't know the	
12	answer to that question.	
13	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Yes. There were	
14	some uncertainty before the security guard issue	
15	was put into the mix with regard to the fact that	
16	there would be differentiations according to the	
17	tour, because time of day makes a difference,	
18	whether you've got fixed posts or not, because	
19	you've got fewer fixed posts in the nighttime	
20	hours. That's obvious points. And I don't think	
21	we can sort that out, even though we can	
22	recognize that there is some variability there.	
I		

		1786
1	Yet, the numbers would be meaningful to us if we	
2	could be assured that they're that they're not	
3	partially security guard hours. How many we	
4	couldn't possibly know. That possibility is not	
5	available to us, I think.	
6	THE WITNESS: At this moment, right.	
7	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Yes. So my my	
8	answer is, if you have a witness that can assure	
9	us that this is all PPOs in the chart, that would	
10	be useful.	
11	MS. GONSALVES: Okay. We will look	
12	into that. And I do believe that Michael is able	
13	to do a further breakdown. I'm not sure how	
14	useful that would be to the panel, but	
15	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: In terms of tours?	
16	MS. GONSALVES: Right. But I don't	
17	I don't know how helpful that would be.	
18	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: I think it's	
19	probably not worth doing, because the numbers are	
20	the PPO numbers.	
21	MS. GONSALVES: Right. Okay. So I	
22	will I will look into that, and I will let you	

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1787
    know, the panel and, of course, Arlus, whether we
 1
    have somebody who would be available to testify
    on that.
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Fine. I think
    that's it, isn't it --
 5
 6
              MR. STEPHENS: Yes, sir.
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: -- for
 8
   Mr. Billingsley?
 9
              MR. STEPHENS: Yeah. No further
10
    questions.
11
               (Witness excused.)
12
              ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Can I have my book
13
    back, please?
14
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: No, the book, the
15
    book.
              MR. STEPHENS: I thought you said
16
    Michael.
17
18
              ARBITRATOR DUFEK: Thank you.
19
              ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: All right. Where
20
    do we stand? If I'm -- if I understand it, that
21
    is the end of the testimony or evidence that we
    have for the day and that we're uncertain whether
22
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		1788
1	there will, at some point, be any rebuttal	
2	testimony?	
3	MR. STEPHENS: I think that's a fair	
4	statement. I think that that can be cleared	
5	up in pretty short order.	
6	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: All right.	
7	MR. STEPHENS: There there are a	
8	couple of documents we're worried the panel	
9	didn't have enough in their binders. Perhaps we	
10	can mail them with Teresa's consent rather than	
11	have everyone have to shuffle them out tonight.	
12	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Well, I'm not	
13	carrying this pile of things tonight anyway, so	
14	we'll have to work that out. All right.	
15	It's possible and I'm just saying	
16	this for the large audience in the room it's	
17	possible that we have arrived at the end of this	
18	hearing. But one thing is certain, that we've	
19	we've arrived at the end of testimonial evidence	
20	for today. So we're going to break now for	
21	for the rest of you, for the viewers, we're done	
22	for the day. This the lawyers and the three	

		1789
1	of us are going to reconvene and talk a bit after	
2	a lunch break, and and we'll see where we are	
3	at the end of that. Will that work?	
4	MS. GONSALVES: Yes.	
5	ARBITRATOR OLDHAM: Okay. Thank you.	
6	(Whereupon, the proceedings were	
7	adjourned at 12:05 p.m.)	
8		
9	* * * *	
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		1790
1	CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC	
2	I, ERICK M. THACKER, the officer before whom	
3	the foregoing arbitration was taken, do hereby	
4	certify that the testimony appearing in the	
5	foregoing arbitration was taken by me in	
6	stenotype and thereafter reduced to typewriting	
7	by me; that said transcription is a true record	
8	of the proceedings; that I am neither counsel	
9	for, related to, nor employed by any of the	
10	parties to the action in which this was taken;	
11	and, further, that I am not a relative or	
12	employee of any counsel or attorney employed by	
13	the parties hereto, nor financially or otherwise	
14	interested in the outcome of this action.	
15		
16	ERICK M. THACKER	
17	Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia	
18		
19		
20	My commission expires:	
21	June 14, 2014	
22		

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